Default and restructuring
When a State stops paying: haircut, rescheduling, and three real cases (Argentina, Greece, Chad).
Lesson 119 min
By the end of this lesson
- Tell a default from a debt restructuring
- Work out the nominal haircut of a bond exchange
- Name three real cases of sovereign default or restructuring
A State does not go bankrupt like a company: you cannot sell off its schools. When it can no longer pay, it defaults, then negotiates a lighter debt with its creditors. What you will take from this lesson: telling default from restructuring, and working out what a holder loses when their debt is exchanged with a haircut.
Default, restructuring, haircut
FINRA calls credit risk "the risk that a bond issuer will fail to make interest payments or to pay back your principal" (FINRA, "Bonds"). When that risk materialises, we speak of default.
Default
A borrower's failure to pay interest or principal on the date set in the contract.
Debt restructuring
A negotiated change in the terms of a debt (amount, coupon, maturities) to make it bearable for the borrower.
Haircut
The share of a claim's face value that the creditor gives up in a restructuring.
In plain wordsThe wholesalers round the table
Imagine a shopkeeper who owes money to several wholesalers and, after a very bad season, can no longer pay. The wholesalers can keep pressing: they will get nothing back, the till is empty. So they sit down with him and agree on a lighter debt: a bit less to repay, more slowly, at a gentler rate. The share they give up is the haircut. They lose out, but they will be paid again; he keeps his shop, with a dented reputation. For a State this is truer still: nobody can sell off its schools.
Writing for the face value of the original claim and for the face value received in exchange:
A restructuring can cut the principal (a nominal haircut), lower the coupons or push back the maturities (a rescheduling). The last two also reduce the debt's value for the lender, even without touching the face value: being paid later and less is worth less.
An ordinary bond
A holder owns a fictional Kalao bond: face value 10,000 F, 7% coupon, repayable in 2 years.
A State pushes back the repayment of its bonds by ten years without touching the face value. Do holders lose anything?
Three historical cases
Argentina, 2001. According to the IMF's Independent Evaluation Office, "In December 2001, Argentina defaulted on its sovereign debt and soon afterwards abandoned the convertibility regime", the peg of its currency to the dollar (IMF, IEO, 2004).
Greece, 2012. The final exchange offer is announced on 24 February 2012. By the end of April 2012, about 197 billion euros of bonds out of 205 billion eligible had been exchanged for securities with longer maturities and lower coupons, with a nominal haircut of 53.5%; the debt fell by about 107 billion. On 9 March 2012, ISDA (the derivatives industry association) declared a "credit event", technically a default. The European Stability Mechanism calls it "by far the largest restructuring of sovereign debt held by private" creditors (ESM, Discussion Paper 11, 2020). Each bond was exchanged for new 10- to 30-year bonds worth 31.5% of the original value, plus 15% paid in the short term (PIIE, Policy Brief 13-3).
Chad, 2022. In the CEMAC zone, Chad and its external creditors reached an agreement in November 2022 on the treatment of its debt under the G20 Common Framework; the official committee brought together China, France, India and Saudi Arabia, with private creditors. The IMF states: "This is the first Common Framework accord", and says it protects Chad against downside risks, "including lower oil prices" (IMF, press release no. 22/379).
The detailed terms of the Chad agreement (share of rescheduling, whether or not principal was reduced) were found only in the press and in commentary: they are not stated here. A sovereign default can cost holders a great deal, small savers included: a high rate on a government bond signals that risk, it does not remove it.
What a holder loses, the Greek wayFictional
A holder owns fictional Kalao bonds with a face value of 10,000 F. Kalao offers an exchange modelled on the Greek proportions of 2012: new bonds worth 31.5% of the original face value, plus 15% in short-term securities.
- New bonds: 31.5% × 10,000 = 3,150 F of face value, repaid in 10 to 30 years.
- Short-term securities: 15% × 10,000 = 1,500 F.
- Total face value received: 3,150 + 1,500 = 4,650 F.
- Nominal haircut: (10,000 − 4,650) ÷ 10,000 = 53.5%.
- Real loss is bigger: the 3,150 F will only be repaid in 10 to 30 years, with low coupons. Their value today is less than 3,150 F; the loss in present value therefore exceeds 53.5%.
Why creditors accept
Refusing does not bring the money back: a State in default pays nobody. Accepting a haircut means being paid again, on a debt the State can carry. In return, the State comes out with a dented reputation and often more expensive access to credit for years.
From memory: define a haircut, and give the country and year of the first G20 Common Framework agreement.
Your turn
Read next: ESM, « The 2012 private sector involvement in Greece » (2020)
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